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 This study examines the federal government’s neglect of its trust responsibilities 
to the Oneida tribe of New York, and focuses on how the Oneida have used gaming 
enterprises to flex their sovereignty toward acquiring land and resources. The Oneida of 
New York are the Wolf Clan, one of three distinct Oneida tribes; the others are located in 
Wisconsin and Canada. The first part of this analysis addresses major time periods 
representative of federal and state policies toward tribal societies in general, and the 
Oneida in particular. This section begins with a brief overview of the U.S. Revolution 
and the changes that it brought to American Indian communities, and then reviews the 
major federal policies representative of historic time periods: American Expansion and 
Removal (1830s-1850s), Allotment and Assimilation (1890-1920), Indian New Deal 
(1920s-1940s), Termination (1940s-1960s), and Self-Determination (1970s-1980s). The 
second part of this paper addresses the advent of tribal gaming, the issues the Oneida had 
developing gambling on their reservation, and the development of their first casino. The 
third, and last part, examines how the Oneida have flexed their sovereignty to acquire 
more property and develop future casinos. The Oneida of New York are one of a few 
tribes that have been able to use their history to their benefit, and their successes in 
gaming have enabled them to become a dominant political and economic force in New 
York 1  
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1 This essay uses American Indian and Native American interchangeably. Contemporary 
authors and Native Americans have embraced American Indian as an acceptable 
identifier.  
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 The U.S. Revolution created divisions among eastern tribal societies in a few 
political stances, often tribes stayed neutral at the onset of the war; then, if the war 
reached their territories, they found themselves choosing to side with the British or the 
rebelling colonies. In 1995 Colin G. Calloway explained that the Oneida were divided 
during and after the Revolution, and that their siding with the U.S. rebels—to retain the 
integrity of their lands—would end horribly for them.2 Calloway explained that the 
Native Americans who sided with the British had a reputation for being tyrannical, but he 
argued that they were only fighting against what they thought of as the most oppressive 
faction in the American Revolution—the revolting U.S. rebels.3 Calloway expanded on 
this point further by arguing that the Native Americans’ war for Independence had a long 
history of reoccurring struggles of skirmishes over tribal lands with colonists, British 
regulars, Spanish, French, and other nationalities, and unlike the Revolution their struggle 
would not end in 1783.4 He explained that regardless of the outcome of the Revolution, 
the U.S. government would omit Native Americans from their newly establish 
government, and their lands would be staked out and taken by land companies. At the 
onset of the war, Calloway observed that the Oneidas “split into factions; most supported 
the Americans, but some joined the British…For the Iroquois, the Revolution was a war 
in which, in some cases literally, brother killed brother.”5 He explained that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian country: Crisis and diversity in 
Native American communities, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For 
another account of the Oneida experience during the American Revolution, review David 
Levinson’s article, “An Explanation for the Oneida-Colonist Alliance in the American 
Revolution,” Ethnohistory 23, no. 3 (Summer 1976.) 
3 Calloway, preface, xiii. 
4 Calloway, preface, xiii. 
5 Calloway, 34. 
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Revolutionary War intensified political changes in Indian communities.6 Calloway wrote, 
“[w]hat Europeans called tribes were often aggregates of communities; many Indian 
communities were also multiethnic units rather than members of a single tribe.”7 
Europeans created the ideology of an “Indian race” to homogenize multi-ethnic groups 
ignoring territory differences in order to score large land settlements. Calloway explained 
that the Oneida suffered mightily during the Revolution, but had believed that because of 
their sacrifices for the rebels, the U.S. would respect their treaty obligations to them.8 
Their sacrifices however did little for them, Calloway wrote, that “the Oneidas fared little 
better than their New England friends or their Cayuga and Seneca relatives in the 
postrevolutionary land grabbing conducted by the federal government, New York State, 
and individual land companies.”9 He went on to explain that even though in the short 
term General Philip Schuyler intervened on their behalf, leading to two treaty 
agreements—the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1789 (which the U.S. guaranteed “territorial 
integrity” of Oneida and Tuscarora allies) and the treaty of Canandaigua in 1794 (that 
further reinforced their land protection)—but the U.S. defaulted on both of these 
agreements. 10 He wrote, that in the same year as the Canandaigua treaty of 1794, “the 
government absolved its obligations to the Oneidas with an award of $5,000, an annuity 
of $4,500... The state of New York meanwhile negotiated a string of treaties, illegal 
under the Indian Trade and Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, which by 1838 had robbed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Calloway, 54. 
7 Calloway, preface, xvi. 
8 Calloway, 286. 
9 Calloway, 286. 
10 Calloway, 286. 
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Oneidas of their entire homeland.”11 Calloway ended his book by explaining that the 
national mythology after the Revolution would create an argument for taking Native 
American lands. U.S. officials argued that Native American actions during the 
Revolution, such as ravaging colonial lands and atrocities toward non-Indians during the 
war, justified taking their lands.12 Calloway wrote, “Americans at different times 
invented versions of Indian people to suit their particular policies and purposes.”13 In the 
U.S. Declaration of Independence itself, Calloway explained that, 
 “the image of Indians as vicious enemies of liberty became entrenched in 
the minds of generations of white Americans… the emerging national 
memory of the Revolution, responsibility for the brutality and destruction 
of the Revolutionary War on the frontier lay squarely on the shoulders of 
the Indians and their British backers.”14  
 
Thus, Calloway explained that even for the tribes that decided to side with the U.S. 
rebels, they fared no better than American Indian pro-British counterparts.  
 
Andrew Jackson’s policy of “Indian Removal” during the 1830s relocated eastern 
tribes into western territories, both for the accumulation of more land for their growing 
population, and to “develop” what they regarded as “uncivilized land.”15 This policy 
forced thousands of eastern tribes into direct confrontation with western tribes—tribes 
that occupied lands that the U.S. had previously promised to tribes subjected to removal. 
U.S. soldiers, government agents, and elected officials subverted tribal claims to their 
lands. They combined racism with armed force, and began to push these tribes onto 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Calloway, 286. 
12 Calloway, 293. 
13 Calloway, 293. 
14 Calloway, 293, 294. 
15 Albert L. Hurtado, editor et al, Major Problems in American Indian History, 
(Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2015), 243. 
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marginal lands, dubbed reservations, to make way for U.S. society. Native Americans 
responded to these pressures in several ways that depended on independent conditions. 
Laurence Hauptman explained that federal and state policies broke up the New York 
Oneida reservation, to both acquire eastern tribal lands, and push them into “Indian 
territory” (Kansas.)16 The U.S. enacted the removal of the Iroquois through treaty 
documents, which theoretically compensated tribes for their eastern lands. The Buffalo 
Creek Treaty of 1838 affected all six tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy, which stood in 
the way of New York’s expansion to the southeast, and the treaty allowed for the 
movement of goods from the Erie Canal throughout New York.17 Hauptman explained 
that the Buffalo Creek Treaty was “fraudulently consummated through bribery, forgery, 
the use of alcohol, and other nefarious methods,” the treaty entailed ceding all remaining 
Seneca land to the Ogden Land Company for U.S. promises of a 1,824,000-acre 
reservation in Kansas.18 This removal resulted in deaths of tribal members because of 
disease, exposure, and starvation.19 The Iroquois in New York lost 95 percent of their 
land from 1784 to 1861, and from 1838 to 1875 had to deal with the “grasping clutches of 
land speculators, railroad magnates, and state and federal officials intent on obtaining the 
Indians’ shrinking land base. In effect, during the Civil War the Iroquois fought two 
wars, one in the South and the other on the home front.”20 Thus, no matter the outcome of 
the Civil War, their community would be devastated. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Laurence M. Hauptman, The Iroquois and the New Deal, (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1981), 5. 
17 Laurence M. Hauptman, The Iroquois In The Civil War: From Battlefield to 
Reservation, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 106. 
18 Hauptman, Civil War, 12. 
19 Hauptman, Civil War, 110. 
20 Hauptman, Civil War, 5. 
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The Oneida in particular suffered from a court battle in 1876, in which a New 
York Oneida member, Abraham Elm, attempted to vote for a U.S. congressman, and after 
his arrest and imprisonment, the U.S. District Court ruled in favor of his citizenship and 
entitlement to vote.21 However, the court held that, “after ‘the main body of Oneidas were 
removed to Wisconsin in the 1820s and 1830s,’” the remaining “‘twenty families 
constituted the remnant of the Oneidas residing in the vicinity of their original 
reservations,’” and because the families were surrounded by non-Indian people, the court 
ruled that they were “no longer set apart by ‘custom, language and color’…. a distinct 
Oneida community no longer existed in New York.”22 This ruling deemed the families 
remaining on the 32 acres as no longer having distinct tribal status.23  
These examples have explained that New York state chipped away at Oneida and 
Iroquois lands without repercussions from the federal government: from the 1843 Oneida 
allotment, the 1845 allowance of highways through reservations, an 1850 leasing of 
Seneca land for the Erie Railroad, and the illegal leases with Salamancas in the 1860s and 
70s. All of these “agreements” subverted treaties signed by the federal government and 
the Six Nations after the American Revolution.24 The U.S. government and the state of 
New York violated the two Nonintercourse Acts of 1790 and 1793, which sought to limit 
white frontiersmen’s ability of acquiring “Indian” lands through coercion, deceit, or 
bribery of New York officials; the government required ratification of all land transfers 
only by federal treaty (1790) and due to the non-adherence to this first act, congress then 
required a U.S. Indian commissioner to preside over state negotiations for tribal lands 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Hauptman, Civil War, 148. 
22 Hauptman, Civil War, 148. 
23 Hauptman, Civil War, 149. 
24 Hauptman, Civil War, 151. 
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(1793).25 This unwillingness to abide by these Acts represented the state’s failure to abide 
by federal laws, but also the federal government’s unwillingness to enforce its own laws. 
 
 
The Allotment Era (1890-1920) was representative of restructuring Native 
American reservation lands, previously held communally, into allotted segments of a 
once larger territory.26 The General Allotment Act of 1887, or the Dawes Act, caused 
drastic changes to tribally held lands. The Dawes Act was one of many attempts to 
“assimilate” American Indians into the dominant U.S. society; they also utilized boarding 
schools, and federal and religious figures to acculturate them toward U.S. social morals 
and traditions.27 These actions largely instigated strife and ill will toward policies the 
U.S. tried to instill on tribal communities. The Dawes Act allotted lands back to tribes, 
which had been reserved to them by the reservation system—land left over from 
allotment would be sold or given to “non-Indian farmers.”28 The majority of Iroquois 
refused allotment because of their distrust of both the federal government as well as state 
legislators. This is understandable because the Oneida in particular were broken up 
during the 1820s and 1830s; the majority of Oneidas moved to Wisconsin and Canada 
due to the pressures of non-Indians to get at their lands, and especially because of the 
Buffalo Creek Treaty of 1838.29 After the Buffalo Creek Treaty removed their family and 
neighbors, the Oneida of New York occupied a 32 acre-tract of land with twenty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Laurence M. Hauptman, The Iroquois Struggle for Survival: World War II to Red 
Power, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 180. 
26 Hurtado, 361. 
27 Hurtado, 361. 
28 Hurtado, 361. 
29 Hauptman, New Deal, 70. 
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families.30 In 1920, there was another attempt to deprive Oneida of their tribal homeland, 
this time attempting to eliminate the rest of their land holdings. The legal case of United 
States V. Boylan was an attempt to eject the remaining Oneida, and partition the rest of 
their land to non-Indians. The court found that New York “had no jurisdiction in 
disposing of Indians’ property without the consent of the United States,” and the Everett 
Commission, conducted in 1919—to examine tribal cultures and lands within New 
York—“concluded that the Iroquois as Six Nations were legally entitled to six million 
acres of New York state, having been illegally dispossessed of their title after the Treaty 
of Fort Stanwix in 1784.”31 The Everett commission inspired the Oneida and other 
Iroquois to re-acquire their lands through legal battles, but the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
and the state of New York ignored the commission’s findings, telling the Oneida that 
their lands and culture had no federal recognition.  
 
The Indian New Deal Era of the 1920s through the 1940s, as administered by 
John Collier, sought to alleviate badly administered federal policies, especially the failed 
assimilation policies of the allotment era. The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) drafted 
by John Collier, attempted to re-instill American Indian cultures, to retain land bases left 
on reservations not allotted, or add more land to shrinking territories, and to re-instate 
American Indian organization.32 As Laurence Hauptman wrote, 
 “[t]he Indian New Deal formally ended the allotment policies of the past, 
encouraged Indian arts and the study of Indian cultures and languages, 
added acreage to some tribes’ land bases, instituted the codification of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Hauptman, Civil War, 148. 
31 Hauptman, Struggle for Survival, 184. 
32 Hurtado, 401. 
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Indian law…and pushed for tribal political reorganization as well as 
intertribal organization.”33 
 
The Iroquois and many east coast tribes distrusted Collier and his Indian New Deal; first, 
the federal government had failed all previous attempts at “helping” tribal communities, 
second, Collier’s policies had been drafted for southwestern tribes, and lastly, the 
Iroquois viewed reorganization as an interference and threat to their sovereignty.34 
Paradoxically, during Collier’s Indian New Deal, other policies threatened Iroquois 
sovereignty: 
“[a] series of major issues arose from World War I onward to challenge 
Iroquois self-assertions about tribal and Confedera[te] sovereignty: federal 
legislation such as the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, the Seneca 
Conservation Act of 1927, [and] the Snell Bill of 1930,” all served to 
promote Iroquois distrust of federal policies.35  
 
These acts combined with the previous findings of the Everett Commission’s review of 
New York tribal government systems and land claims, galvanized Oneida and Iroquois 
grass roots movements to curb state and federal attempts to subvert tribal land holdings.  
The Iroquois and Oneida utilized land-based sovereignty to combat the ever-
threatening state and federal land dispossession policies. Hauptman wrote, that the 
“assertion of sovereignty over land from which they were dispossessed is….another way 
the Iroquois express their cultural uniqueness.”36 This land-based sovereignty is 
emphasized by Minnie Kellogg, a Wisconsin Oneida with the help of her husband, who 
began collecting support and money from Iroquois communities, seeking to sue New 
York for illegally acquired lands since the American Revolution. Although they fought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Hauptman, New Deal, viiii. 
34 Hauptman, New Deal, xii.  
35 Hauptman, New Deal, 5. 
36 Hauptman, New Deal, 11.  
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try and get their case heard, no court would hear it, and the monies they raised created 
angst on reservations because those people who contributed to the cause would never see 
their funds returned. Lulu Stillman, Collier’s stenographer, also worked to subvert 
Collier’s plans, claiming, “it was meant for western tribes, not the Iroquois, that it would 
result in increased governmental regulations and intervention in the Iroquois world and 
that it was the first step in securing New York jurisdiction over Iroquois affairs in the 
manner of the Snell Bill of 1930.”37 This argument crippled the Indian New Deal in all 
but a few Iroquoian communities. The Iroquois ultimately viewed it as a rejection of their 
sovereignty. They feared “that citizenship, allotment, taxation, and loss of lands were 
behind everything emanating from Washington as well as Albany…a decade of distrust 
from the era of the Everett Report to the harsher realities of the Great Depression 
contributed to the IRA’s demise in New York.”38 However, this legal sovereignty 
movement was subverted by Great Depression of the 1930s, which left tribal 
communities open to accepting federal assistance, but ultimately rejected anything having 
to do with Collier’s New Deal. The Iroquois land claims movement stagnated during the 
Great Depression through to the 1950s, as tribal people dealt with more severe social and 
economic issues than non-Indians.39  
 
Termination was the U.S. federal policy immediately after World War II through 
to the 1960s. This policy was representative of terminating Federal trust responsibilities 
to tribal reservations, but termination also represented mass movements in which 
American Indians argued that federal treaty obligations needed to be preserved. World 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Hauptman, New Deal, 61. 
38 Hauptman, New Deal, 69. 
39 Hauptman, New Deal, xii. 
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War II witnessed a massive war participation by Native Americans across continents as 
well as at home; according to Ella Deloria, they contributed to the war effort on a few 
fronts: those who went and served their country, those who stayed home, and those who 
left reservations to work in U.S. war plants present in cities.40 World War II ended with 
the United States facing renewed interest in assimilation policies.41 Native American 
presence and contributions to the war convinced the U.S. government that Native 
Americans could assimilate successfully into U.S. society and culture. Instead of focusing 
their policies on re-structuring reservations and the funds that went into to it, they 
attempted to end federal trust, by a policy of termination, and push more tribal people 
into urban settings.42 The Indian Freedom Act, better known as termination, stated, “it is 
the policy of Congress…to make the Indians…subject to the same laws and entitled to 
the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United 
States, to end their status as wards of the United States.”43 Peter Iverson explained that 
the rhetoric did not match its execution. He wrote that, the policy purported “liberating 
the Indians by reducing governmental interference” but what it actually “resulted in [was] 
significant hardships for many Indians.”44 This policy led to an immediate backlash from 
Natives across the United States. Termination, they explained, would allow the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ella Deloria, “Ella Deloria (Yankton Dakota) on Indian Experiences During World 
War II, 1944,” in Major Problems in American Indian History, ed. et al. Albert L. 
Hurtado, (Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2015), 449. 
41 Hurtado, 445. 
42 Hurtado, 445. 
43 Deloria, 453, 454. 
44 Peter Iverson, “Building Toward Self-Determination: Plains and Southwestern Indians 
in the Mid-Twentieth Century,” in Major Problems in American Indian History, ed. et al. 
Albert L. Hurtado, (Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2015), 465. 
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States to remove all prior treaty arrangements made with tribal nations.45 When the U.S. 
faced outright objection from the Iroquois, they attempted to give more responsibilities to 
New York, thus further subverting Iroquois government-to-government relationships 
with the federal government. Laurence Hauptman wrote,  
“[a]fter World War II, Congress handed over criminal and civil 
jurisdiction of the Iroquois to New York State, despite strong opposition to 
the move…[they] have lost significant acreage in the East in the post-war 
period: a dam at Onondaga, the Kinzua Dam’s flooding of the entire 
Cornplanter Tract, the New York State Power Authority’s condemnation 
of the Southwestern corner at Tuscarora, and the St. Lawrence Seaway 
Project that took Mohawk lands…during the 1950s and 1960s.”46 
 
The first part of Hauptman’s quote refers to the transfer of criminal and civil jurisdiction 
during 1948 and 1950 to the state of New York. This was the precursor to Public Law 
280 of 1953, which transferred federal jurisdiction to certain states.47 The Iroquois had 
staunchly resisted this, claiming that it violated early treaty agreements between them and 
the U.S., and argued that it would be yet another attempt at chipping away their 
sovereignty.48 This time period also correlated with land issues between the Iroquois and 
the state of New York. As noted above in Hauptman’s explanation of loss of land as a 
direct correlation to Public Law 280, that “[every] time there is a land crisis…land 
pressures intensify,” and the Oneidas in particular re-instate their land battles that have 
persisted over 200 years.49  
The state of New York claimed that they have always been open to negotiating 
with tribes over their land claims, but as William A. Starna, a Senior Fellow of Nelson A. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Hauptman, Struggle for Survival, 49. 
46 Hauptman, New Deal, 181. 
47 Laurence Hauptman, Struggle for Survival, 48 
48 Laurence M. Hauptman, Formulating Indian Policy in New York State: 1970-1986, 
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Rockefeller Institute of Government, has noted, “interviews clearly point to a conscious 
decision not to negotiate…although the state asserts its interest in negotiating settlements 
rather than litigating them…the exact opposite has been true.”50 In the 1760s and 1770s 
the Oneida brought forth a legal test-case, which would ultimately allow American Indian 
land-claims cases to be heard in federal courts. George Shattuck, the Oneida attorney 
during the 1960s and 70s Supreme Court test-case, noted that New York had repeatedly 
made claims that they were open to negotiation with the Oneida; for instance, the 
Assistant Attorney General for New York state, argued that the Oneida did not bring a 
“timely suit,” and instead had waited 200 years to make their contention.51 As noted 
above, the Iroquois, and especially the Oneida, had constantly sought to hear their land 
cases in court, and have been continuously denied. Shattuck successfully argued through 
“archaeological, historical, and linguistic expert findings, that the Oneidas…were 
federally recognized successors in interest to the Oneidas of the 1790s...that federal 
officials had always responded to the Oneidas by denying the merit of the claims and 
discouraged legal action,” he further explained that, “[t]hey were wrongly advised after 
1920 that they had no federal tribal status…barred from New York state courts….[and] 
denied a legal forum.”52 Shattuck argued that the federal government, as “their guardian,” 
violated the constitution, three treaties, the Non-intercourse Acts, and congressional 
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responsibilities to allow tribes to sue in court.53 Hauptman explained the impact of the 
Oneida case, when he wrote, “[t]he landmark United States Supreme Court Oneida 
decision of 1974 overturned 140 years of American case law; it is also the only case that 
has been decided favorably on the issue of whether the tribe’s rights to land have been 
violated.”54 After securing the monumental decision, the court held that, “the Trade and 
Intercourse Acts were applicable to the original thirteen states,” the Oneida went on to 
win another test-case in 1985 directly related to their 1974 test case, involving 900 acres 
of reservation land that Oneida and Madison counties “[found] liable for damages [and] 
fair rental value for two years, 1968-1969… for unlawful seizure of Indian ancestral 
lands.”55 The Iroquois in general had to deal with New York state agencies, headed by 
Robert Moses, which sought to attain Iroquois lands for public programs. Hauptman 
wrote, 
“[during the] 1940s, it is clear that he [Moses] defined reservations as 
‘sacrifice areas’ for his ideas of progress. In 1945…Moses commissioned 
a study to evaluate the potential impact of the then proposed Kinzua 
Dam…[Moses] supported a federal plan to buy the entire Allegany Indian 
Reservation and remove all Indians in order to promote flood control and 
develop the valley for recreational purposes.”56 
 
The 1950s witnessed Moses combining park interests with “new concerns for power 
development, seaway transport, and heavy industry,” he did this through the St. Lawrence 
Seaway as well as the Niagara power project.57 Moses encroached on tribal territories so 
that he “would not alienate white voters and their political representatives,” scapegoating 
tribal lands and demonizing Indian communities, rather than risking the U.S. backlash by 	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allocating public lands for his projects.58 It was not only power and water rights that 
officials sought during the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, they secured highways that traversed 
Iroquois lands; for example, the New York State Thruway Authority, and the Department 
of Transportation had highway Routes 81, 90, and 17 going directly through tribal 
reservations, but individual tribes would often accept the offers due to the impoverished 
state of their communities.59  
A border controversy also galvanized tribal movements across the continent 
during the 1940s through the 1970s. A large part of the Iroquois nation moved to Canada 
after the American Revolution, as well as during the Buffalo Treaty of 1838, and is one 
of the two main confederate councils of the Oneidas. Hauptman explained, “[t]oday two 
Iroquois leagues continue to function, one centered at Onondaga near Syracuse, New 
York, and the other at Six Nations Reserve near Banford, Ontario,” and despite their 
distance from one another, they maintained close political and economic ties, especially 
over the legal battles concerning Iroquois territory.60 The Jay Treaty between the Iroquois 
and the U.S. secured “free passage and unrestricted trade to all Iroquois dwelling on both 
sides of the United States-Canadian border.”61 In addition to the Jay Treaty, the Treaty of 
Ghent “restored the rights set forth in the Jay Treaty, which had eroded due to the War of 
1812.”62 A number of acts since then have led to a confusing amalgam of rules and 
regulations concerning who can cross the borders and what they can bring to and from: 
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the 1924 Immigration and Naturalization Act and the Citizenship Act of 1924 seemed to 
say that “Canadien Indians could no longer cross the U.S. border,” changes to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952 “restricted free passage to those Indians who 
met a 50 percent blood quantum requirement,” then to current times in which the 
government now allows “free passage to any Indian who possesses a tribal membership 
identification card;” and even with identification cards, crossing the border often depends 
on those individuals working border patrol on any given day.63 Hauptman explained, 
“since the New Deal; through sit-down demonstrations and border-
crossing celebrations on bridges connecting the United States and Canada; 
through dramatic appeals made to international organizations such as the 
League of Nations, the United Nations, or convocations dealing 
with…human and/or treaty rights; through draft resistance, rejection of 
legislation emanating from Albany and Washington, assertion of land 
claims, sending Confederacy delegates to take over of Wounded Knee in 
1973, as well as their own forced occupations of contested areas,” 64  
 
As noted in Hauptman’s quote, the border issue as well as land battles lent the Oneida 
and Iroquois a forum to press their assertiveness and push for self-determination. To this 
day, the “Indian Defense League holds its annual celebration of the Jay Treaty every July 
with a parade across the International Bridge connecting Niagara Falls, Ontario, to 
Niagara Falls, New York.”65 American Indian activism during this period paralleled the 
Civil Rights era, but did not cross over, because of the differing ideologies of the 
movements, Charles Wilkinson explained, “[t]ribes strove to protect their sovereignty and 
land bases, matters outside the scope of civil rights…Blacks were determined to 
eliminate segregation and allow integration; Indians sought to reverse forced 
assimilation,” thus the Red Power movement primarily centered around remaining 	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sovereign, protecting land, and revolting against federal policies that sought to limit their 
tribal societies.66  
 
II 
 
 The second part of this paper analyzes how the 1970s and 1980s, often referred to 
as the Self-Determination era, affected the New York Oneida toward the development of 
their Turning Stone Casino, and how that casino, originally a trailer bingo-hall, has 
allowed them to acquire land through economic development. This section will assess the 
major issues regarding their tribal lands up to 2013, focusing on three major court battles, 
and ending with an agreement between the Oneida of New York and the state of New 
York, which concluded their 49-year-old court battle over land. 
 
 The Oneida reservation was a 32-acre parcel of land, originally part of their 
300,000-acre reservation demarcated after the American Revolution. The tribe’s gaming 
history began after a tragedy on June 25th, 1976, when a home caught fire and claimed 
the lives of two of their tribal members.67 The County of Oneida, in an agreement with 
the Oneida tribe of New York and as established in Public Law 280, were required to 
send fire response units to deal with instances of fire on the reservation, but did not:  
“Newspaper reports at the time said Herbert D. Brewer, then-mayor of the 
neighboring town of Oneida, had ordered firefighters not to respond to 
calls from the Indian reservation without police backup…jurisdictional 
issues that were the cause of tension…stemmed from a land claim against 
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two New York state counties for the return of 270,000 acres to the Oneida 
Nation Reservation.”68  
 
This quote highlighted that the County of Oneida’s refusal to respond to the reservation 
fire, was centered on the 1974 test-case County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation of New 
York State. The Oneida Nation responded to this crisis by flexing their own sovereignty; 
they felt that no agency would protect them from wrong doing in the future. Ray 
Halbritter, a representative of the New York Oneida and CEO of Oneida Nation 
Enterprises, explained, “[t]he first issue was fire protection, in the state of New York, 
there are a lot of volunteer fire departments, that raise funds by having bingo nights. We 
decided to do a bingo game;” thus, their first attempts at gaming focused on protecting 
their community from future reliance on outsiders, and providing social mechanisms to 
benefit the community.69 Their thinking toward the bingo hall centered on sovereignty, 
that since they were not under state jurisdiction, they could offer higher prizes than local 
bingo games licensed by the state of New York.70 The bingo hall was an instant success, 
but drew the unwanted attention of local law enforcement. The District Attorney issued 
warrants for their arrests and closed down the facility.71 Because of the impoverished 
state of the Oneida community, the tribe did not have the ability to launch a legal 
challenge to the closure.72 “It was, by most accounts, the country’s first Indian gaming 
facility,” this argument is substantiated by Ray Halbritter, when he went to visit the 
Seminoles after their historic Supreme Court decision; claiming that “[they] said they got 
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the idea to do gaming from the Oneida Nation bingo hall.”73 The Seminole Tribe v. 
Butterworth decision in 1981, in which the court ruled that tribal reservations, under the 
jurisdiction of the federal government, could not be subjected to state interference 
without federal permission.74 According to Theodore Gordon, a doctoral candidate at the 
University of California Riverside, the case stated that, “Florida had criminal but not civil 
or regulatory jurisdiction…if an activity is totally prohibited by the state, it is illegal on 
tribal lands, but if the activity is regulated by the state, tribes are free to develop their 
own regulations.”75 This case opened up gaming to all reservations within states that 
allowed some form of gaming, thus the only two excluded states were Hawaii and Utah. 
The Seminole case and the case of the Cabazon Tribe vs. the State of California opened 
up gaming rights for tribal communities, and weakened states’ arguments about their 
jurisdictional power over tribal reservations. The Cabazon case, another issue of police 
shutting down bingo and poker clubs, led to the tribes suing in 1980; and, in 1987 the 
U.S. Supreme Court “ruled that state and local governments could not regulate high-
stakes bingo and other gaming on Indian reservations if state law allowed such forms of 
gaming.”76 These were the two main legal cases that led to tribal gaming in the U.S.  
The main piece of legislation meant to regulate tribal gaming was the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA.) According to Donald L. Flixico, this legislation 	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“undermined tribal sovereignty, yet it also established a procedure that protected potential 
gaming tribes against intermingling from state governments.”77 Sioux Harvey further 
explained, that "[t]he two primary purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 
were: (1) to help protect Indian gaming from organized crime and (2) to establish a 
federal regulatory authority for gaming."78 In addition to these two main aspects of 
IGRA, it also established that Native Americans retained an exclusive right of gaming on 
reservation land, it created three classes of gambling, and it instilled state-compacts. 
Harvey explained the first aspect, the exclusive right, as, “[tribes retained] tribal authority 
over non-Indians on reservation lands."79 Harvey explained the classes of gaming as, 
"Class I encompasses social and traditional games; Class II is limited to bingo...Class III 
includes primarily slot machines, casino banking and percentage games, off-track betting, 
and lotteries."80 The state-compacts meant to end the bickering between tribal casinos and 
state officials, but this was an affront to tribal sovereignty, "[a] deal was made wherein 
Indians set aside some of their sovereignty in return for what Congress and the tribes 
thought would be a ‘rational scheme of management of gaming activities on Indian 
lands.’"81 As this relates to Oneida gaming and sovereignty, New York has argued 
against Oneida sovereignty at every turn. Gaming was just a new issue for their 
complicated relationship. 
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IGRA required the agreements of state-tribe compacts before casinos could be 
created. This meant that the Oneida needed to strike an agreement with New York before 
establishing their casino. In 1993, the Oneida created a compact with New York that 
would allow class III gaming on their reservation.82 The compact with Governor Cuomo 
allowed “the tribe to offer virtually any form of table games,” but “[s]lot machines, video 
games, off-track betting, poker and lottery games are not permitted.”83 The Oneida soon 
drew angst from state legislators because of their initiation of a slot-like machine, a 
“multi-gaming machine,” that the Oneida developed and own the patent for. This 
machine has “no lever, do not require players to insert money and do not return 
money…the terminals don’t seem to fit the legal definition of a slot machine.”84 Some 
lawmakers argued that the Oneida violated the spirit of the law, “[t]hey seem to have 
found a way around every law except the one that exempts them from paying taxes.”85 
The argument on tribal exemptions from paying taxes has been coopted with regard to 
gaming. Contrary to popular public opinion, “[g]ambling has not improved the lot of 
most Indian people…[a]lmost 32 percent of Indians live in poverty, compared with 13 
percent of the general U.S. population; nearly 15 percent are unemployed,” and 
furthermore due to IGRA’s stipulations, profits from casinos were earmarked for “social, 
welfare and economic-assistance programs historically regarded as Washington’s 
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responsibility.”86 Thus, American Indian gaming is not similar to private gaming in the 
U.S., because of the fact that corporations are allowed to use their casino profits 
indiscriminately, while tribal gaming specifies where their profits are to be spent. 
 
The economic prosperity from the Oneida’s Turning Stone Casino has allowed for 
massive multi-regional development around their reservation. Since their establishment 
as a doublewide trailer bingo-hall in 1993, their profits have allowed the Oneida many 
assets since its establishment. In the first weekend of their bingo game, they counted a 
profit of $150 dollars.87 Fast forward to 1995, two years after their casino was 
established, and an economic study explained that the Oneidas’ had 1,900 employees, 
1,500 of which worked at the Turning Stone Casino, they had a payroll of nearly $1 
million, “mak[ing] it one of the largest employers of the region, they generate $12 million 
in the local economy, not counting what they receive from the casino, and they bring a 
“net local tax gain of approximately $6.6 million” due to the jobs they created within the 
local economy.88 In 1997 it was the only casino in New York and was a central 
destination for tourism and shopping.89 In a 1997 annual report, the Oneida tribe became 
the “largest employer in Madison and Oneida counties,” employing “2,850 people, 90 
percent of who are non-Indian, earning an average annual salary of nearly $25,000 in 
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wages and benefits,” and built a brand new hotel at the casino, which “created 400 jobs 
for hotel staff, restaurant employees and retail personnel.”90 They also added an 
additional 22,000 square foot gaming space, were awarded their patent of the “Instant 
Multi-Game Technology,” achieved awards for their RV park, added six retail outlets, 
added another gas station, totaling 3 in all, built a full service car center,” their textile 
printing enterprise moved to a 25,000 square foot office, added 4 high speed presses, and 
added another smoke shop, brining the total to 4.91 They also added more social services 
to their community: provided new health insurance coverage, which entailed 
comprehensive “medical, dental, eye care and prescription coverage,” added ten town-
homes, and started construction on the Ray Elm Children and Elders Center, a 34,000 
square foot building.92 In 1998, the Oneida had a 800-seat showroom, an arcade, beauty 
salon, business center, catering department, conference center/boxing arena, health spa, 
pool, a ranch, eight restaurants, four golf courses, two marinas, 7 gas stations, two plazas, 
invested in 10 different social services programs and buildings, spent $8 million on 
regulating their casino, and returned $2.6 million in BIA funding “so that other Indian 
Nations could use it in their efforts to achieve economic self-sufficiency.”93  In addition 
to their properties and services, in 1998 they employed 3,000 people, 2500 in the Turning 
Stone Casino, of which 10-15% were Oneida nation members.94 The Business Journal of 
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Syracuse ranked the Oneida Nation as the 13th largest employer in the 16 counties that 
make up Central New York,” with a payroll of $70 million a year.95 In 1999, the Oneida 
“spent $99 million in goods and services from outside vendors; $40.8 million of that 
spending was from vendors in the three counties (Madison, Oneida and Onondaga) 
directly surrounding the Nation. The Nation’s workforce generates more than $5 million 
a year in property tax revenues for Madison and Oneida counties…[and] $23 million in 
state income, sales and other tax revenues.”96 Tourism has doubled since 1993, when the 
Turning Stone Casino opened, and visitor spending in Oneida country in 1999 was 
$120.9 million.97 This analysis has explained that Oneida economic development has 
been decidedly beneficial since their bingo hall began in 1976, both for their reservation 
and the surrounding counties.  
 
III 
This newfound economic income and development has allowed the Oneida to 
seek lands outside of their 32-acre reservation with hopes toward opening new casinos, as 
well as expanding their land base. The 1974 Supreme Court test case that overturned 140 
years of U.S. case law, and allowed tribes a venue to hear their cases in court, has 
allowed the Oneida to seek even more claims to their lost lands.98 As described earlier, 
the 1985 test-case, County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, involved 
less than 900 acres that Oneida and Madison counties acquired in violation of the 
Noninterocurse Acts of 1790 and 1793. The court’s decision went in the Oneidas’ favor, 	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the justices required the two counties to pay “fair rental value for two years, 1968 and 
1969, for unlawful seizure of Indian ancestral lands,” and the case was also important 
because it reaffirmed the 1974 test-case, which allowed tribal communities to bring suit 
to reacquire lost lands. The case concluded with a recommendation that the federal 
government step in and settle the Oneida land cases.99 The federal government did not 
move to support the Oneidas until 1999, fourteen years after their 1985 test case was 
approved. The Oneida have since named “20,000 property owners in central New York 
as defendants,” this has been their attempt to move their case through the court 
systems.100 The U.S. federal government’s role in supporting the Oneida land claim of 
over 270,000 acres, found them again distancing itself from the Oneida due to the public 
fury over involving the 20,000 independent landholders in their law suit.101  
This move to name defendants drew ill will from government officials: “the 
Oneida Indian Nation does not pay taxes. And thanks in part to their new Turning Stone 
Casino, the Oneidas have seemingly risen from abject poverty to unbridled affluence in a 
very short time, while their neighbors have been grappling with a tough local 
economy.”102 The Oneida found themselves demonized by how politicians and the U.S. 
public viewed their attempts at reparations. A case that had been in the making for 29 
years had yet to be decided, and the Oneida were attempting to move it along.  In 1995, a 	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different land issue arose, the Oneida sought to increase their land base in the Catskills by 
establishing another casino. New York Governor George E. Pataki was against those 
plans.103 The casino would be established ninety miles from New York City, which 
would be closer than Atlantic City and the Foxwoods Resort Casino.104 The land 
acquisition would be located in an area in economic turmoil, which has long “wanted to 
attract casinos but have been blocked by Albany.”105 The property they were seeking to 
buy was the Monticello Raceway, located in Sullivan Country, and because of Governor 
Pataki’s stonewalling, the Oneida offered to pay New York, “the equivalent of the top 
corporate income tax in exchange for” the Governors approval.106 If the governor still did 
not act, the tribe stated that it would take the matter to court.107 The top corporate tax on 
earnings was 9%, but the Oneida “will not open their books, meaning that any payments 
would be determined by a formula- based on something like average expected losses per 
bettor—rather than a direct tax—…It would be for less than a non-Indian casino would 
pay in gaming taxes.”108 The Governor responded through his spokesperson Aileen Long, 
who explained that the “Governor remained opposed to casinos that do not pay local and 
state taxes.”109 However, part of the Governor’s job, as mandated by the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, is to work with local tribes, and in the case of taking new land into trust, 	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their jobs are to determine whether a casino would be “detrimental to the surrounding 
community and [if] it would be good for the tribe.”110 Interestingly, Sullivan County had 
already backed the Oneida, for both the benefit that a casino would bring to their much 
depressed tourist industry, but also that the Oneida had promised to “pay Sullivan County 
and its municipalities $5 million a year while they have the monopoly on casinos in New 
York.”111 Thus, both counties had already backed the Oneida in establishing subsequent 
casinos. 
This deal fell through and represented the issues that face tribal sovereignty; even 
though the Oneida had the backing of the local counties, they were still facing opposition 
from the New York state governor. The Oneida also faced issues through having to work 
with the Interior Department in their attempt at taking the land into trust. The Interior 
Department wanted the opinion of the governor, who had been quite anti-Oneida in the 
past. The Oneida’s attempts were foiled in 1995, but have remained active through to 
current time. In 2003, the Oneidas had competition in the Catskills between the St. Regis 
Mohawks, Cayuga Nation of New York, Wisconsin Oneida, and the Stockbridge Munsee 
band of Mohicans.112 New York Senator John J. Bonacic, a Catskill district 
representative, argued in his own words, “the governor has refused to approve casino 
deals with other tribes in a vain hope that he could lure Mr. Halbritter into settling the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Goldin, “Oneida Offer Albany an Inducement.” 
111 Goldin, “Oneida Offer Albany an Inducement.” 
112 Charles V. Bagli, “Deal by Wisconsin Oneidas May Clear Way for Casino,” The New 
York Times, November 19, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/19/nyregion/deal-by-
wisconsin-oneidas-may-clear-way-for 
casino.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI
%3A12%22%7D&pagewanted=print. 
Hanover,	   28	  
state’s largest land claim by offering him a Catskill casino.”113 This attempt never came 
to fruition while he was in office, but it explained the stonewalling by Governor Pataki 
for the eight years that the Oneida lobbied for the Catskills property.  
 
The 2012 Congressional hearing, “Fulfilling the Federal Trust Responsibility: The 
Foundation of the Government-to-Government Relationship,” reviewed the trust 
relationship of nationally recognized tribal nations with state and local governments and 
the relationship between the tribes and the federal government.114 The hearing recognized 
a litany of tribal speakers, one of which was Ray Halbritter, an Oneida nation 
representative and Wolf Clan tribal leader. Halbritter’s opening statement and prepared 
testimony primarily highlighted tribal sovereignty and economic development issues 
relevant to both the Oneida and all tribal nations within the United States. His opening 
statement addressed the general role of trust relationships and the federal recognition of 
Iroquois and Oneida sovereignty. He cited the initial trust doctrine between the U.S. and 
the Oneida, the Treaty of Canandaigua—signed in 1794 by George Washington. 
Halbritter explained that it expressly recognized two things, “the United States 
acknowledges the lands of the Oneida, called our reservation, to be our property, and the 
United States will never claim our lands, nor disturb us in the free use and enjoyment of 
our lands…[and that, the treaty] provides safeguards to both parties,” so that if one party 	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did harm against the other, their would be just compensation and friendship sustained no 
matter the issue.115 Furthermore, Halbritter argued that treaty documents retain obligatory 
language that binds the U.S. and its territories from overreaching into tribal issues and 
sovereignty. Halbritter asserted that it was the Federal government’s responsibility to 
safeguard tribal lands secured in government-to-government treaties. As he explained,  
“in the case of New York’s use of its own tax codes to stop transfer of the 
lands into trust, the duty of addressing those issues falls on the United 
States pursuant to its treaty obligations. The United States sometimes 
fulfills its obligations, oftentimes it does not and, when it does, it 
frequently comes after the damage is done.”116  
 
Halbritter cited the third legal case involving Oneida attempts at reacquiring lost lands, 
City of Sherrill vs. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, which ruled that the Oneida could 
not bring newly acquired lands into trust.117 Halbritter explained that his testimony meant 
to highlight past uses of trust and government-to-government interactions, but also stated 
that there should be an amendment to this relationship by “creating a new bipartisan 
American Indian Policy Commission” to review tribal self-sufficiency, aid the poorest 
reservations, help tribes close to self-sufficiency to achieve it, and include a “mechanism 
to ensure that the funding of critical Indian programs are not subject to arbitrary 
reductions,” or misappropriations by state and county governments.118 Halbritter 
explained that recent tribal sovereignty has been defined by courts rather than by inter-
governmental collaboration, and has led to a redefinition of trust relationships. Halbritter 
further explained, “[s]ome of those decisions have turned the trust relationship on its 
head, emphasizing its value as a shield from federal liability instead of construing it in a 	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manner that would benefit the very people who were the intended beneficiaries of it.”119 
This statement explained how tribal sovereignty has been viewed by the public, that it is a 
“shield” exempting tribes from taxation and allowing assistance from programs that the 
U.S. public does not benefit from. But Halbritter countered this by explaining that the 
Oneida in New York are one of the largest employers in the state, and as far as their tri-
county area is concerned, they have “invested more than $1 billion in infrastructure in 
Central New York. We have spent $2 billion on goods and services with non-tribal 
vendors…we have generated more than $140 million in income and property taxes for 
the state and local governments.120 Furthermore, Halbritter argued that court decisions 
have changed sovereignty relationships between federal and tribal governments. For 
instance, Halbritter cited Carcieri vs. Salazar as a case in point. This legal decision 
designated that only tribes which were federally recognized during the Indian 
Reorganization Act, could have lands taken under trust by the U.S., this effectively 
created a precedent by which state, local, and federal governments could rule against 
tribal societies that have made land progress since 1934. As such, Halbritter argued, 
“[c]ongressional action is magnified where the United States Supreme Court issues 
opinions that are contrary to Indian laws and settled expectations,” in essence 
government-to-government relationships should not constitute a court mandated 
liberty.121 Instead, Halbritter explained,  
“the federal government’s trust responsibility is grounded in the United 
States’ fulfillment of its treaty obligations, implemented based upon 
historic and the inherently governmental agreements between each 
separate Indian nation and the United States…[but] is complicated by the 	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actions of non-federal parties who regularly insert themselves into matters 
that should be primarily between the United States and Indian nations.”122  
 
These rights were mandated in a myriad of treaties between the U.S. and tribes 
across the U.S; established in the U.S. Constitution; and a litany of historic 
Supreme Court decisions, such as the “Marshall Trilogy.”123 Overall, Halbritter 
argued that government-to-government relationships erode, and if there are not 
actions taken to safeguard tribal sovereignty, then there will be a reoccurrence of 
tragedy that has been historically prominent in tribal relationships with the federal 
government. He argued that to prevent federal and state infractions, there needs to 
be safeguards secured through the creation of a bi-partisan Indian Policy Review 
Commission, which would create consultation committees and help impoverished 
tribal nations and self-sufficient nations stay afloat. In essence, this congressional 
document expressly discussed how the Oneidas’ and other tribes’ sovereignty 
have been at risk, because the federal government have allowed courts to do what 
has historically been their obligation—writing effective tribal policies that benefit 
both the U.S. government as well as their tribal counterparts. 
 
In conclusion, trust relationships and state and federal policies have shifted to the 
courts, further eroding the government-to-government relationship between Native 
Americans and the federal government. This is threatening tribal communities because of 
the transgressions they have faced in the past with respect to local and federal court 
systems. The Oneida are one of a few instances when the courts have ruled in their favor, 
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and even so, the discussion above has so far encapsulated their test-cases. They have had 
to “test” that their cases are viable before bringing them to legal action. This conclusion 
both encapsulates how the Oneida land-issues have been resolved, in reference to their 
three legal cases, and overall stresses how little interaction the federal government has 
had with respect to their treaty obligations. In brief, the Oneidas’ first court land battle 
was decided in 1974; since then, the Oneida have accumulated over 14,000 acres of land. 
By 1997 it had purchased an area of 5,000 acres, but due to Oneida and Madison 
Counties’ lawsuits, they have been unable to secure their acquired lands into trust.124 But, 
finally on May 16th, 2013, the case between the Oneida tribe of New York vs. Madison 
and Oneida Counties was decided in a deal between the Cuomo administration and the 
two counties.125 The deal required the Oneida Turning Stone casino to give the state 25 
percent of its revenue from slot machines, the Oneidas agreed to “place no more than 
25,000 acres of land into trust, effectively settling the tribe’s longstanding land claims,” 
the state would give 25 percent of the revenue that it received from the Turning Stone 
casino to Oneida County, Madison County would “receive a one-time payment of $11 
million for past tax claims,” and the two counties “agreed to drop continuing litigation 
against the Oneidas over the tribe’s application to put land into trust.”126 The deal would 
also “grant the Oneida Nation exclusive rights to casino gaming in Central New York,” 
for the portion of its revenues stated above. The location would cover “a ten county 
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region of Central New York (Cayuga, Chenango, Cortland, Herkimer, Lewis, Madison, 
Oneida, Onondaga, Oswego, and Otsego counties).”127 The Oneida also  
“expressly waives its rights of sovereignty over any land over the cap 
amount,…impose a Nation sales tax that equals or exceeds the state’s and 
counties’ sales [which would]…apply to all cigarettes, motor fuel, and all 
other sales by Indian retailers to non-Indians…[and] to waive its sovereign 
immunity for enforcement of the agreement.”128  
 
The deal seemed to favor New York, but it does allow the Oneida to open more casinos 
on property that could expand to 10,000 additional acres with their tribal population of 
roughly 900 members.129 Thus, the reason the Oneidas’ land cases have been resolved is 
a result of their historic assertion of sovereignty through land claims, together with 
economic power accumulated through casino development.  
The Oneida contestation of land claims through court battles, the overall rejection 
of federal and state policies seeking to restrict their power, and reoccurring declaration of 
sovereignty allowed the Oneida to remain resolute with their dealings with the Federal 
and New York governments. It must be stressed that without their court battles over land, 
the Oneida may never have been recognized as a federal tribe, might never have 
challenged Oneida County for failing to respond to their reservation fire—which lead to 
establishing their own casino—and furthermore would not have been able to barter with 
the state of New York and the two counties over securing a deal that recognized their 
sovereignty
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